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While it is widely agreed today that autism involves a cognitive change (Baron-Cohen, 1988),
the main psychological models have put the explanatory weight on changes in such non-
linguistic neurocognitive variables as “theory of mind” (ToM), weak central coherence, or executive
functioning. Linguistic deficits, including ones identified as “pragmatic” and taken to be universal
in people with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) (Tager-Flusberg, 1996; Lord and Paul, 1997; Tager-
Flusberg et al., 2001), or even the absence of functional language could then be seen as a secondary
consequence of a primary defect in non-linguistic (particularly social) cognition (Mundy and
Markus, 1997). A “modular” perspective, which separates language from cognition, has been widely
adopted with regard to the internal organization of language itself, which is taken to comprise
phonology, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics as relatively independent components. In this regard,
Tager-Flusberg (1981) formulates the classical view that “phonological and syntactic development
follow the same course as in normal children and in other disordered groups, though at a slowed
rate, while semantic and pragmatic functioning may be specially deficient in autism.”
More recently, attention was drawn to a potential subtype of ASD, autism with language
impairment (ALI), showing deficits in structural aspects of language comparable to those in
Specific Language Impairment (SLI) (Tager-Flusberg and Joseph, 2003), additionally to standard
impairments in social interaction and communication, and behavioral abnormalities. Specific
deficits in such domains as non-word repetition (phonology) or verbal inflection (morphology),
as seen in this subtype (Tager-Flusberg, 2006), however, provide little basis for understanding
the distinctive ASD cognitive “style” (Happé and Frith, 2009). Indeed the absence of co-morbid
non-verbal cognitive impairment is a defining feature of SLI.
Yet it is not clear how independent of language human-specific forms of social interaction and
communication can be, and it could be that a fundamental alteration in language competence is an
inherent aspect of the cognitive change in question. Children with autism might construe language
differently, reflecting a linguistic style different from that inherent in neurotypical cognition, which
could then be reflected in altered patterns of social communication. Rapin andDunn (2003) already
suggested, not only that phonology and syntax are impaired in autism, but that there is a relation
between phonological and syntactic deficits, and between semantic and pragmatic ones. Kjelgaard
and Tager-Flusberg (2001, p. 10) suggest that phonological deficits are only present in those children
with higher-order semantic and syntax deficits.
Language could matter in a different way, if it was more than communication—and more even
than a human-specific style of communication: It could also be cognition, i.e., a principle for having
the particular type of thought that is communicated in language (Hinzen and Sheehan, 2013). It
is surely not simply an accident that humans, apart from having the cognitive type that they do,
also speak: subtracting our linguistic capacity from our cognitive toolkit does not allow the same
mind to develop, though now it is now tragically speechless. Language makes us social in ways
that no other species is, allowing us a form of communication in which propositional thoughts
can be articulated and shared. A look at the cognitive types and communications of non-linguistic
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species (Hauser, 1996; Penn et al., 2008; Tomasello, 2008), and
at the cultural productions of extinct hominins (Tattersall, 2008),
suggests an explanatory gap between species with and without a
language-like symbolic code. Language remains one of the most
likely cognitive principles for explaining what transformed pre-
sapiens cognitive phenotypes into their modern human variety,
re-configuring the hominin mind rather than merely expressing
one that pre-existed the arrival of linguistic communication
(Tattersall, 2014). Hinzen and Sheehan (2013) describe the
organizational principles of language as those of human-specific
thought.
In line with this linguistic model, we also see language playing
an intrinsic role in the development of normal thought and
communication in infants (Vouloumanos and Waxman, 2014).
Where there is no exposure to speech/sign, or language does not
develop normally, thought is diminished or altered as well, as
in language-less adults (Schaller, 2012), deaf children deprived
of a sign language (Humphries et al., 2014), or children with
autism, as we argue below. Arguably our relationship to ourselves
in general, i.e., our human-specific sense of self, is mediated by
language and narrative, in that we canonically refer to ourselves
in the grammatical 1st Person (“I”), connecting linguistically
to others who are grammatical 2nd Persons for us (“you”).
What we say to them in turn carries information about a
world viewed as distinct from both of us and the thoughts we
share: it is grammatically the 3rd (or non-) Person (“it,” “s/he,”
“that”). This threefold distinction of grammatical Person spans a
“deictic space” in which all human thought and communication
is anchored or embedded. This space is partially human-specific
and Person distinctions are defined in relation to when speech
acts take place, making a relation not only to language but to
speech/sign inherent. Saying “I” as and when we speak, we locate
ourselves in this space, with a past that partially defines us, a
future which language helps us to creatively construct, and a
personal narrative involving others. We argue in the remainder
that a disturbance in this language-mediated deictic frame could
play a key role in making sense of the autism cognitive and
communicative phenotype, providing a unified linguistic and
psychological model.
That language is indeed construed differently in ASD is
strongly suggested by the universality of both communicative
and pragmatic impairments in the autism spectrum, while the
status of repetitive behaviors and interests is more contested
(Mandy and Skuse, 2008). It could only be by separating a
“pragmatic” or a “communication” impairment from a “language
impairment,” that the claim of a language impairment in only
a subgroup of individuals could be upheld. In general, language
and human-specific communication can barely be separated.
Our position predicts that language in ASD should not merely
be delayed or slowed but altered, in ways that illuminate the
cognitive change, and a significant decrease in general syntactic
ability across children with ASD as compared with children
with developmental delays or mental retardation has now been
documented (Pierce and Bartolucci, 1977; Eigsti et al., 2007). In
Eigsti et al., 2007, syntactic ability was negatively correlated both
with use of jargon/echolalia and with presentism/concretism
(lack of displacement). Beyond delayed onset of first words as also
present in other disorders, children with ASD can show a deviant
pattern of lexical growth (Lord et al., 2004).
As for problems with communication, the problem in
ASD does not lie in communication as such—children with
ASD can and do communicate—but in the normal forms of
linguistic communication (Maljaars et al., 2011). There are
basic disturbances in speech production and perception that
could have resounding effects in the contents communicated
in speech. Alterations in speech perception (Alcantara et al.,
2004) and the preference of speech over non-speech (Klin,
1991) have been documented and neurophysiological methods
have revealed a “profoundly different stimulus-processing
manner in autism” partially specific to sound discrimination
in speech (Kujala et al., 2013). Speech (or sign), the vehicle
of linguistic communication, which preferentially captures
newborn infants’ attention from birth (Vouloumanos and
Waxman, 2014), does not attract autistic children as much.
Typically developing 6-month-old infants grasp the abstract role
of speech in communication before having knowledge of words
(Vouloumanos et al., 2014), which must further enhance their
development, whether of language or thinking. By contrast, even
siblings at high risk for ASD at 12 months do not pay the
same attention to speech as typically developing children (Curtin
and Vouloumanos, 2013). Deficits of prosody are also common
(Peppe et al., 2007).
Furthermore, supposedly “non-verbal” aspects of cognitive
development such as joint attention or pointing appear to be
inherently linked to linguistic development. A tight coupling
of declarative pointing and language has been demonstrated in
normal children (Cartmill et al., 2014). Mundy et al. (1990), in
a longitudinal study of early joint attention and language, found
that the former was a significant predictor of the latter in autistic
children. Joint attention seems to be crucially enhanced by a bias
toward speech already present in newborn infants (Vouloumanos
and Waxman, 2014), and it is an ingredient of declarative
pointing, which is clearly impaired in ASD. Declarative pointing
is co-morbid with a structural change in the deictic use of
language more generally, manifest in misuses of such expressions
as “here” vs. “there” and “this” vs. “that” (Hobson et al., 2010;
Hobson and Meyer, 2005).
Regarding the contents of communication, the normal
declarative use of language for the purpose of affirming and
sharing thoughts is deviant in verbal children with autism
(Loveland et al., 1988). This is neither merely a communicative
nor a pragmatic impairment, but also concerns the distribution
of linguistic forms: imperatives cannot, in virtue of their form,
encode declarations, while declaratives can express commands
only via implicatures. Maljaars et al. (2011) found that among
three forms of communication, namely behavior regulation,
social interaction, and joint attention, the proportion of the
first to the third was much higher in children with autism
than in typically developing children, who showed the opposite
pattern. The non-verbal group with autism did not or barely
communicate for declarative purposes and used the least complex
forms of communication.
Part and parcel of the general problems with deixis are
classical misuses of pronouns, as in the non-shifted pronoun use
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resulting from echolalia but also the spontaneous substitutions
of non-standard grammatical Persons for where personal (1st
or 2nd) forms would be expected. In a recent corpus-based
study of two French-speaking autistic children, Dascalu (2014)
found that non-standard (2nd and 3rd) personal forms of self-
reference and the normally expected 1st personal forms can
seem context-equivalent to the autistic children. One child used
French “il” (“he”) as a “passe-partout” referential device fitting
all objects of reference equally. Grammatical Person was not
merely distorted, moreover, but there is a distinctive Person-shift
from personal to 3rd-personal forms for self-reference, while the
reverse is not the case. As these findings suggest, not use of
pronouns as such is impaired, but grammatical Person is. This
does not appear to be the consequence of a general problem
in “perspective-taking” in some non-linguistic sense, since the
children did take the perspectives of others, as in numerous
examples documenting that they are pursuing the trains of
thoughts of others, imitate others, and role-play. The Person shift
in its grammatical dimension is also confirmed by numerous
earlier studies showing a preference of 3rd Personal forms of self-
reference (such as the child’s own proper name) in both spoken
(Jordan, 1989; Lee and Hobson, 1994; Mizuno et al., 2011) and
signed language (Shield and Meier, 2014); and by the fact that it
does not occur in isolation but as part of a larger disturbance in
the referential use of language. Thus Modyanova (2009) showed,
in a comparison of indefinite NPs (e.g., “an/another apple”)
with definite NPs (“the/that apple”), that children with autism
compared with Asperger’s or Pervasive Developmental Disorder
(PDD-NOS) showed no knowledge of definite determiners at all
(Lord and Rutter, 1994).
In sum, the evidence synthesized here suggests a seismic
shift in grammar-based semantics and the deictic space in
which all thought, speech, and reference takes place. The
language change we see concerns core linguistic functions
that depend on specific forms of grammatical organization,
such as Person, determiners, or sentential complexity, though
to different degrees. These functions mediate cognitive ones,
and they specifically concern how language normally mediates
a species-specific deictic frame. It is not clear which non-
linguistic deficit would account for this change, when it is
linguistically highly specific, and ToM in particular has itself
long been noted to be strongly correlated with language
in its explicit form (DeVilliers, 2007; Paynter and Peterson,
2010). This motivates casting a novel linguistic eye on mental
change, in line with recent developments in linguistic theory
that see linguistic organization as a central principle for a
human-specific cognitive type and self (Hinzen and Sheehan,
2013).
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